Animal genetic engineering seems to point at a normative gap beyond pathocentric welfare theories in animal ethics. Recently developed approaches aim to bridge this gap by means of new normative criteria such as animal dignity and animal integrity. The following comparison of dignity and integrity in the context of animal ethics shows that the dignity concept faces serious problems because of its necessarily anthroporelational character and the different functions of contingent and inherent dignity within ethical reasoning. Unlike animal dignity the concept of animal integrity could prove to be a useful enhancement for pathocentric approaches.

Utilitarian ethics recognises animals as moral objects, but it does not attribute an absolute value to human or non-human individuals. Animal ethics according to Regan defines the non-human individual as an inherent value, but concedes that humans should be given precedence over animals if a situation involves a decision between life and death. Such life and death decisions relate to the fundamental structures of biological nature. To individuals these fundamental structures (the paradox of life and death) will necessarily appear absurd. The metaphysical dimension of animal ethics tries to shed light on the connections between life and death, body and mind that underly ethical discussions and searches for alternatives to the natural organisation of life.

In this essay I investigate Schopenhauer’s position on the ethics of animal experiments. I argue that both his analysis of the dangers involved in performing vivisection on a wide scale and the guidelines he suggested in order to limit this cruel practice remain theoretically relevant in the context of today’s debate on animal rights. Schopenhauer responded to the rapid increase in the use of animals at universities by calling for a philosophical system able to address the problems of animal ethics and treating vivisection as an important moral issue.

This essay is divided into three sections: first, I reconstruct the historical background of Schopenhauer’s reflections on vivisection; then I present the philosophical basis of Schopenhauer’s guidelines for an ethical treatment of animals in university laboratories; finally I underline the modernity of Schopenhauer’s position, focussing on a few specific examples (such as the problem of performing vivisection on apes).