In occidental cultures the relation of humans to animals is determined by the human perception of the outer world. Using motives from evolutionary epistemology it is argued that the evolutionary pressure to adapt increasingly obscures perception, where perception means relating to the outer world in a way that is independent of interests. Therefore, the pressure to adapt and to realise the interest to adapt obscures perception. This results in a reduced self-perception. Two phenomena exemplify this: persons ignoring their own bodies and a reductive perception relating to animals, such as reducing the value of animals to mere human resources. This reductive perception explains the very limited success of the animaI rights-debate.

In animal ethics a Right to Life has been postulated repeatedly, but no valid argument has been produced yet. Thus the question of a Right to Life in animaI ethics remains unanswered. It is remarkable that no philosopher has yet found a valid argument against Epicurus (“there is nothing fearful in the absence of life”). On the other hand, there is - again based upon Epicurus’ argument - a basic moral duty with respect to painless killing (i.e. no fear, no distress, no suffering).

State and church must be separated; therefore the legal and the judicial system may not be based on religious dogmas but instead must be grounded on empirical-rational ethics, which are amenable to consensus. To achieve this, consciousness must be described in scientific terms and the anthropocentric view of animals as fundamentally different to humans must be criticised on a factual basis. It turns out that consciousness determines autonomy. And consciousness is an evolutionary continuity, meaning that there is no basic difference in consciousness between humans and animals. Life is of the utmost instrumental value to autonomous beings, as it enables them to realise their autonomy and is thus in their highest interests. In contrast, killing is the greatest harm that can be done to such beings. As I, being an autonomous being, want to act autonomously, I demand a right to life from society to do so. The principle of universality compels me to demand the same right for every other autonomous being.

Although the introduction of GM animal models at first was viewed as a potent way to enhance experimental biology in the name of the 3Rs by its proponents, over the years, the number of animals used has greatly increased and concerns about the suffering of these animals have emerged in the debate. The purpose of this contribution is to show the need and the urgency for a systematic evaluation of genetically modified laboratory animals (GM animals) according to the 3Rs principle. This evaluation presents various difficulties due to the special features of the genetic modifications of animals, the variety of scientific purposes connected with the use of these animals, the lack of coherent statistical data about this use and the difficulties related to the welfare assessment of these animals. In this article I discuss the significance of the procedures involving GM animals for each of the 3R principles. On this basis, I offer an answer to the question of whether these procedures are compatible with the spirit of the 3Rs.